Central among the complex philosophical problems created by the development of contemporary physics is the problem of the objectivity of physical knowledge, the problem of the reflection of objective reality in our knowledge.

Niels Bohr was born on October 7, 1885. He was one of the great innovators in physical science in the twentieth century. It so happens that 1985 also marks fifty years since the long discussions, which had begun in the 1920s between Albert Einstein and Bohr on the philosophical problems of quantum physics, attained their apogee. An article co-authored by Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, "Can Quantum Mechanics Be Considered a Complete Description of Physical Reality?," was published in 1935 (...) in the journal Physical Review. According to Bohr, "by virtue of its clarity and, it would seem, flawless argumentation, the work of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen has created excitement among physicists and played a great role in the discussion of general philosophical questions of physics." Precisely as a result of the publication of this article, the critical position of Einstein concerning quantum mechanics became known to a broader circle of physicists. In the same year, Bohr responded to Einstein and his co-authors with an article under the same title. (shrink)

The specificity of tantric soteriology consists of a combination of three basic principles - unity, salvation, and bliss. This article explores the principle of salvation. Spiritual liberation implies the final overcoming of obstacles hindering the new worldview. Unlike the principle of unity, the principle of salvation focuses on difference, not on identity, drawing a sharp line between the desired state of liberation and the present state of dependence. The main obstacles to spiritual liberation are expressed in the well-known triad “avidyā (...) - karma - saṃsāra”. The principle of salvation appears in Tantrism in two interrelated forms, the ascetic and śaktic ones. Both of them agree with each other in rejection of spiritual ignorance. Spiritual ignorance is the main “negative goal”; without deliverance from it there is no freedom. The state of ignorance is existential one and endowed with powerful protective “forces”. The principle of salvation implies the deliverance not only from everything that is usually considered negative, but also of “positive” things. In the śaktic mode of the principle of salvation, it is assumed that an incorrect view of reality is eliminated by a correct view of it. Due to the fact that, according to the tantric adepts, the energies of the divine Śakti act in the world, the understanding of this fact leads the adept to stop perceiving himself as a dependent being even in the midst of an infinite variety of processes and events of the world. Life is then perceived as an unconditioned, spontaneous “divine play”, a stream of divine pleasure. Ascetic form can be reduced to an ontological interpretation of the principle of salvation, and śaktic form to a cognitive one. (shrink)

The transition from capitalism to socialism that is taking place in our epoch confronts the science of philosophy with the problem of theoretical analysis of the dialectics of contemporary social development and of progress in science and technology. Taking into consideration the fact that the process of social change is occurring under conditions of exacerbation of the ideological struggle of the forces of socialism and capitalism, Marxist philosophers face as their most important project a deep-going, comprehensive critique of current bourgeois (...) philosophy and sociology, as well as of revisionist distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory. (shrink)

Lenin's work "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," written in the spring of 1922, is justly regarded as the philosophical testament of our leader. In it, the tasks of the day were merged with the tasks of the entire epoch on the basis of a profound analysis of reality.

In November 1969, the USSR Academy of Sciences' Presidium held a discussion on the principal lines of work being engaged in by the Academy's Institute of Philosophy. A report on this matter was presented by the Institute's director, P. V. Kopnin, Member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Participants in the discussion of the report were M. V. Keldysh, President of the USSR Academy, Academicians F. V. Konstantinov, M. B. Mitin, A. M. Rumiantsev and P. N. Fedoseev, and Corresponding Academician (...) Ts. A. Stepanian. (shrink)

The scientific career of the outstanding Russian physiologist A. A. Ukhtomskii was complex and full of contradictions. A descendant of Prince Vsevolod Big Nest [Bol'shoe Gnezdo] of Suzdal', he was strongly influenced by the traditions and legends of his caste. As a juvenile he was sent to the Nizhnii Novgorod Corps of Cadets where he developed a profound interest in philosophy, psychology, history, and literature. His fellow cadets of the same age were amazed at, and sometimes ridiculed the young Ukhtomskii's (...) attempts to find answers to the burning questions of the day in the books of Shakespeare and Dostoevsky and in scientific works. Ukhtomskii's notebooks and synopses of those years show how this youth, from age 15 to 17, pondered over cardinal problems of world view, the contradictions of Russian society, and the future of science. The barracks life of the cadets, the rigorous schedule and supervision did not suppress Ukhtomskii's persistent desire to get a closer knowledge of the life of Nizhnii Novgorod, a major mill town and river port. He managed to make the acquaintance of members of a group of Marxist workers and maintained contact with one of them, M. Ia. Iakovlev , for over 40 years. (shrink)

Grigorii Savvich Skovoroda was a distinguished philosopher of the eighteenth century Ukraine who made a significant contribution to the development of philosophical thought and enlightenment ideas. A contemporary of N. I. Novikov, Ia. P. Kozel'skii, and A. I. Radishchev, he reflected in his work the protest of the laboring peasant masses against serfdom. This protest was the starting point for his philosophical interpretation of the world, man, problems of social justice, and the paths along which they could be resolved. Representing (...) the antifeudal movement for enlightenment in the Ukraine, he linked the freedom of his people to unification of the Ukraine with Russia and to the general struggle for implementation of anti-serfdom ideals. (shrink)

In this paper we summarise the constraints that low-redshift data—such as supernovae Ia, baryon acoustic oscillations and cosmic chronometers —are able to set on the concordance model and its extensions, as well as on inhomogeneous but isotropic models. We provide a broad overlook into these cosmological scenarios and several aspects of data analysis. In particular, we review a number of systematic issues of SN Ia analysis that include magnitude correction techniques, selection bias and their influence on the inferred cosmological constraints. (...) Furthermore, we examine the isotropic and anisotropic components of the BAO data and their individual relevance for cosmological model-fitting. We extend the discussion presented in earlier works regarding the inferred dynamics of cosmic expansion and its present rate from the low-redshift data. Specifically, we discuss the cosmological constraints on the accelerated expansion and related model-selections. In addition, we extensively talk about the Hubble constant problem, then focus on the low-redshift data constraint on \ that is based on CC. Finally, we present the way in which this result compares to the high-redshift \ estimate and local measurements that are in tension. (shrink)

v. 1. Recuperări ; Receptarea pragmatismului ; Pragmatismul până la Peirce.

Les carnets de fouilles de Smith et Myres fournissent 25 épitaphes amathousiennes inédites, auxquelles se joignent deux épitaphes d'un cippe récemment découvert et de nouvelles lectures de textes déjà connus. L'ensemble fait connaître 31 noms nouveaux, des surnoms et deux ethniques encore non attestés à Chypre (Αίγαιεύς et Θηβαίος). Les formules funéraires amathousiennes, et l'explication des liens de parenté se révèlent plus variées qu'il n'apparaissait jusqu'à présent et l'usage relativement fréquent de la métronymie se confirme. Un index rend compte des (...) 108 inscriptions récemment publiées (IA I à V) dans le BCH. (shrink)

Dalam Alkitab Kristen tersimpan empat kisah Injil yang dengan cara- nya masing-masing menceritakan hidup dan karya Yesus dari Nazaret. Riwayat-riwayat itu dapat sangat bermakna bagi pembaca yang satu, tetapi juga sulit dipahami oleh pembaca yang lain. Hal ini disebabkan, antara lain, karena manusia masa kini kurang akrab dengan latar belakang, zaman dan tempat kisah Injil tersebut ditulis. Bagaimana mengatasi kesulitan itu? Peter Walker, seorang dosen Alkitab di Universitas Oxford, yang pernah meneliti situs-situs di Tanah Suci, dan berpengalaman sebagai pemandu rombongan (...) peziarah, menemukan solusi yang menarik dan sangat berguna. Ia menyusun buku In the Steps of Jesus, untuk memperkenalkan kisah Injil terutama Injil Lukas sambil membawa pembaca buku ini ke tempat-tempat terjadinya adegan-adegan riwayat hidup dan karya Yesus. Tempat-tempat itu diperlihatkannya dengan foto dan gambar, disertai keterangan yang mampu membuka mata dan hati pembaca................................................ Tahun lalu kami sudah memperkenalkan kembaran buku ini: In the Steps of Saint Paul: Penabur Sabda Segala Bangsa, yang disusun oleh pengarang yang sama, Peter Walker, dan juga diterjemahkan oleh pener- jemah yang sama, pakar Alkitab V. Indra Sanjaya dan diterbitkan pula oleh Kanisius. Kedua buku ini bukan hanya enak dipandang dan dibaca, tetapi juga memberi informasi yang dapat diandalkan oleh pembaca dari kalangan mana pun yang ingin lebih mengenal sejarah awal agama Kristen dan warisannya di Palestina serta wilayah Laut Tengah. Buku In the Steps of Jesus ini merupakan suatu penziarahan tersendiri, semacam napak tilas perjalanan hidup Yesus. Selain dapat menjadi buku panduan bagi segelintir orang yang sempat berwisata ke Tanah Suci, buku ini juga membuka kesempatan “berziarah batin” bagi mereka yang tidak pernah akan dapat berangkat ke tanah itu; dan tentu tetap juga memberi banyak pencerahan bagi mereka yang telah pulang dari ziarah yang nyata. (Martin Harun, Program Studi Ilmu Teologi, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov is one of the most original and as yet inadequately studied Russian thinkers. Neither a professional philosopher, nor a well-known scholar, nor a critical essayist, he led a kind of double existence while working as an ordinary civil servant, developing his original philosophy at his leisure in the hours free from his intensive daily work. Fedorov's life was one of selflessness and self-denial, not at all eventful outwardly. He graduated from the Gymnasium in Tambov and completed three (...) years of study in the Law Department of the Richelieu Lyceum in Odessa, after which he taught for a number of years in the Borovsk, Lipetsk, Podol'sk, and other regional schools. The quarter century he spent working in the Library of the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow was the most stable period in Fedorov's life. Fedorov's ideas attracted the attention of outstanding cultural figures. F.M. Dostoevskii became acquainted with them in 1878 through Peterson, and on March 24 of that year he wrote: "I am essentially in full accord with these ideas. I read them as if they were my own." L.N. Tolstoy, who knew Fedorov personally, said, "I am proud to be living in the same times as such a man." V.S. Solov'ev, who also associated with Fedorov, wrote to him as follows in the mid-1880s: "Your ‘project’ is the human spirit's first advance along the path of Christ since the advent of Christianity. As for me, I can only acknowledge you as my teacher and spiritual father." A.M. Gorky was especially impressed by the activism in Fedorov's views. But none of this precludes the many and very essential divergences of these authors from Fedorov. One can find some links with his ideas in A.N. Belyi, V. Ia. Briusov, N.A. Zabolotskii, V.V. Maiakovskii, A.P. Platonov, M.M. Prishvin, I.L. Sel'vinskii, O.D. Forsh, and V.N. Khlebnikov. The artist B.N. Chekrygin drafted a large fresco entitled The Resurrection of the Dead [Voskreshenie mertvykh] and a philosophical work entitled The Synod of the Resurrecting Museum [Sobor voskreshaiushchego muzeia], both inspired by Fedorov's teachings. (shrink)

v. 1. Ensaios filosóficos. Exegese da ação. Dialética das consciências. Idéias para um nôvo conceito do homem. Teologia e antihumanismo. Filosofia da mitologia e da religião.

P. Ia. Chaadaev continues to attract the attention of researchers of Russian thought. Some recent publications in our press justify the assertion that scholars are interested not only in this or that side of the views of "the philosopher of Basmannaia Street" but also in the very character of his mentality and its place in the history of Russian philosophical thought. Thus, Viacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov writes in his article "Chaadaev-Our Contemporary" [Chaadaev-nash sovremennik] : "There are several reasons why Chaadaev is (...) not at home in Russia and in the history of Russian thought. One of them is his extreme rationalism and logical orientation. He is the follower of Western European rationalism, mainly, I think, of the French rationalist tradition. For him the chief achievement of civilization is the syllogism, the deduction of logical conclusions from some kind of premises and he takes history to be a unified whole." The same problem of Chaadaevan mentality is raised by P.V. Kuznetsov in his article "The Metaphysical Narcissus: P. Ia. Chaadaev and the Fate of Philosophy in Russia" [Metafizicheskii nartsiss. P. Ia. Chaadaev i sud'ba filosofii v Rossii] , which contrasts Chaadaev's thought with the Eastern "apophatic consciousness.". (shrink)

The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...) threads of moral discourse, made in turn of other interwoven threads, including transmission of shared codes, appeals to reform of prevailing custom, rational argument about the justification of some precept on the basis of some shared general teaching or principle, and rational argument about the ultimate basis for principles and justification of authoritative teaching. That is, the approach adopted to the reading of ethical texts depends on a firm belief in the fact that philosophers hardly created any ethical doctrine out of nothing. The main point this book tries to highlight is how different philosophical theories emerged and followed each other as a result of attempts at accounting for what was going on in the world of moral traditions. Changes were propelled by controversies between different schools, and highly abstract arguments were the unintended effects of moves made by controversialists forced to transform (and occasionally to turn upside down) their own doctrines in order to face the challenge posed by other arguments. This is the reason why the book examines not only texts that already enjoy pride of place in the history of philosophy (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), but also other texts usually treated in the histories of religions (the Bible, the Talmud, the Quran), and others considered to be much less philosophical (Plutarchus, Pufendorf). -/- 1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism. Two different traditions of morality in VI-V century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates answer to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy. Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistence in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The chapter illustrates then the relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater familias, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexis, or ‘disposition’. Prudence, or better practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with bouleusis or deliberation is examined, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a way of life. The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. -/- 4. Epicurus and ethics as self-care. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of a science of well-being aiming, more than at pleasure as in the popular view, at reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. Cicero is treated, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is chosen as the best example of what the Stoic tradition could yield, an art of living based on sophisticated introspection, in turn aimed at making a kind of cognitive therapy possible, dismantling obnoxious passions at their root by systematically correcting false representations. -/- 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism. A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torā (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Leviticus is stressed as the turning point when emphasis mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, is combined with the legal tradition, yielding the change in sensibility of the Second Temple time. Philo of Alexandria is described as one of the three leading figures – together with Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Yeshua – at the apex the emergence of the mentioned new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, two eventually identical precepts whose meaning is arguably more sober and sensible than the long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine has made us believe and no novelty vis-à-vis so-called Ancient-Testament teachings. -/- 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism. The first section examines the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirqé Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deòt, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexeis and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was ‘the tool by which the world was built’; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous , but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure Judaism. The third section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manichaeism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. The last section summarizes the turbulent history of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and a few topics from the Stoic-Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua had been influenced by cynic preachers, is a proof of the necessity felt by Christian preachers to translate the original ‘Christian’ teaching into a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where an early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 8. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism. The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. Al-Farabi wrote an enjoyable remake of the Platonic Republic, arguing that the citizen’s virtues were the basis on which the political building needs to rest. The secular lawgiver is enlightened by the light of reason in his everyday practice of governance, but room is made for the Prophet as the voice of revealed truth that confirms and completes the rational truth that philosophy may afford. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 9. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelian ethics. The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place a first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed just less striking traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Torah and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirké Avot could be translated. -/- 10. Thomas Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics. In the first section the fresh start is described of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium. In a first phase, Anselm and Peter Abelard built on a Platonic and Augustinian legacy. In this phase. remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. Aquinas’s ethics is a theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract a self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave "pure nature" incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones, such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too demanding and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Ia-IIae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas could reduce the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethic, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is not ethical ‘absolutism’, as both traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularist enemies of dogmatic morality tend to believe. It is instead an ethic of prudential judgment. Exceptions to this approach – or better results of logical fallacies – are such claims as the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts", claims that simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences Thomas did not live long enough to draw or was not consistent enough to dare to draw. -/- 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry. The first topic illustrated is the discussion about the notion of pura natura, namely the human condition after the original sin and before divine revelation. The core notion was already there in Aquinas but was later developed by Caietanus (Thomas de Vio) with a number of interesting implications: firstly a view of human nature as such much more positive than Augustine’s and his followers’ view, including both Calvinists and Jansenists; secondly, the implication that the philosopher’s morality, as opposed to the Christian’s morality, is a quite respectable kind of morality; thirdly, that theocracy and prosecution of the unfaithful lacked justification, with more far-fetching consequences than Aquinas himself had dared to draw. The second topic is casuistry, a new name for a comparatively older way of thinking, which was already there in late Stoicism and Cicero as well as in the Talmudic literature. This is an approach aimed at yielding probable enough solutions for doubtful cases even in absence of completely safe staring points. The genre developed from medieval reference books for confessors and became by the sixteenth-century a sophisticated tool-box for dealing with various fields of applied ethics. Francisco Vitoria, the main authority of Baroque Scholasticism, was a controversial figure, among the proponents of the new discipline of casuistry and a consistent proponent of more separation between the religious and the civil authority, stricter limits to the legitimacy of war, innate rights of non-Christian nations in the New World based on the notion of pura natura, providing a standard of ‘natural’ goodness, previous to revelation, on which the Indian nations were judged to live in a naturally good condition, provided with the institutions of family, justice, and religion had accordingly a right to full respect by Christian sovereigns. Bartolomé de Las Casas, arguing along similar lines, was the leader of a historical battle in defence of the rights of the Indios. -/- 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living. A short description of one of the Renaissance Phyrronism, one of the classical philosophies revived in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Montaigne combines the sceptical epistemology with an understanding of ethics – indeed of philosophy as a whole – in terms of an art of living inspired by two basic ideas, sagesse, that is, practical wisdom as the only kind of rationality available after theology, science, and tradition have declared bankrupt, and an aesthetic ideal of self-transformation through the art of writing and introspection. -/- 13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism. The chapter illustrates first the vicissitudes of Augustinianism newly born after the late medieval triumph of Thomist Aristotelianism in the alternative Protestant and Catholic versions processed by the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Then it illustrates the doctrines of Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal’s best disciple, on the impossibility of introspection, on the ubiquity of self-deception, on the incurably evil character of the passion of love, and on the two moralities, the one of the man of the world, the morality of honesty which is indispensable for granting peace and order but devoid of any true value for eternal salvation, since the same external behaviour may be prompted by opposite motivations, and the morality of charity, the only true one but also useless to society. The third topic is Pierre Malebranche’s view of self-deception as a ubiquitous phenomenon accounting for human action and responsibility and his reformulated theory of self-love, no less ubiquitous than for Nicole and yet not as incurably evil, given the distinction between morally indifferent and even necessary amour de soi and vicious amour proper, a distinction on which the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political theory rests. -/- 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality. The chapter is dedicated to the discovery of the idea of a ‘new moral science’. Hugo Grotius is discussed first highlighting the real character of his project, much closer to the Thomist idea of a natural law accessible to non-corrupted human reason when human beings are living in a state of pura natura. Then Hobbes’s combination of scepticism, voluntarism, and conventionalism is described and both the continuity with Grotius’s new science, in the search for non-revealed rational morality, and the break with him, in the adoption of voluntarism and refusal of an intellectualist view of natural law, are illustrated. Pufendorf’s work is illustrated as a synthesis of the two previous attempts and the – up to Schneewind underestimated – paradigmatic example of the new science of morality. -/- 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism. The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number possible sets of laws on a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world. 16. Richard Price and intuitionism. The chapter describes first the doctrines of the Cambridge Platonists, an example of hyper-rationalist reaction to Calvinism. Secondly it describes the sophisticated and universally ignored – from Sidgwick to Anscombe –version of what was later labelled ‘ethical intuitionism’ – showing how it escapes familiar objections and misrepresentations of intuitionism – from Mill to Rawls – in grounding its argument on transcendental arguments while carefully avoiding recourse to introspection and psychological evidence, which has been taken as a too easy target by critics of intuitionism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses Whewell’s ‘philosophy of morality’, as opposed to ‘systematic morality’, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such rational truths but requires consideration of the ongoing dialectics between idea and fact in historically given moralities. Whewell’s intuitionism turns out closer to Kantian ethics than commentators have made us believe until now, and quite different from what Sidgwick meant by intuitionism. -/- 17. Adam Smith and the morality of role-switch. The chapter describes first, Hutcheson’s attempt at basing the ‘new science’ of natural law on different bedrock than Pufendorf and the English Platonists, namely a moral sense, a faculty whose existence is assumed to be proved on an empirical basis. The second step is a reconstruction of Hume’s rejoinder in terms of a new science of man including morality on an ‘experimental’ basis, that is, a ‘Newtonian’ hypothetical-deductive approach, distinguished from Hutcheson’s allegedly uncritical descriptive approach to human nature. The third step is a reconstruction of Adam Smith theory of morality understood as emerging from a spontaneous interplay of exchanges of situations (the most basic meaning of the word ‘sympathy’ as construed by this author). -/- 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. The Enlightenment spirit that suggested the idea of a new morality, free from religion, is illustrated. The notion of utility is illustrated as well as the subsequent formulations of the principle of utility. The idea of felicific calculus is discussed, showing how its inner difficulties prompted several reformulations of the principle of utility in order to avoid undesirable implications of proposed formulations. The role of the thesis of spontaneous convergence between interest and duty is discussed, showing how it left numberless questions open, and the distinction between the virtues of prudence, justice and beneficence is described as a way out of the deadlocks of classical utilitarianism. After Bentham, Mill’s reformed utilitarianism is reconstructed, showing how it is a kind of mixed system – as closer to common sense as it gives up Bentham’s claims to consistency and simplicity – resulting as unintended consequences from the controversies in which Mill was too keen to engage. The hidden agenda of the controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image of the battle between Prejudice and Reason, is described, showing how both competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. -/- 19. Immanuel Kant, practical reason and judgment. The chapter argues that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an ‘empirical moral philosophy’ or moral anthropology including treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life. -/- 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the critique of abstract universalism. The chapter describes first the Romantic movement and the implications some of its concerns, rescuing passions, community, tradition, the individual as the bearer of a unique destiny, and the longing for organic unity between the individual, mankind and nature. Hegel’s contribution is discussed then, highlighting how, on the one hand, he shared a number of these concerns and on the other he had more rationalist leanings. The notion of morality is the pivotal point of the reconstruction, highlighting how Hegel construes this notion as a key to his own diagnosis of the malaise of modernity – the separation of individual and Gemeinschaft – and how his attack on Kant turns around this very idea. -/- 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment. The chapter illustrates first the idea of deconstruction of the back-world of values. Nietzsche claims to be legitimate heir of the French moralists, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in so far as he allegedly carries out to its deepest implications their discovery of what lies behind traditional naïve belief in the existence of an objective realm of values just waiting for description by the philosopher. The two exemplars form which genealogy draws inspiration are the classical philologist’s historical reconstructions of lost meanings and the chemist’s decomposition of elements. Then the genealogy of the notions of good and evil carried out in the first dissertation of Genealogy of morals is illustrated with its paradoxical conclusion that will to power is in fact the only ‘genuine’ kind of goodness. The third point illustrated is the dialectic of ascetism and self-realization with its ambiguous outcome. The suggested interpretation of such outcome is that Nietzsche’s normative ethics is a kind of virtue ethics taking an aesthetic ideal as a normative standard -/- 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism. The chapter discusses the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences to reach, also in ethics, the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of the intuitionist philosophers, was what was worth considering as the expression of intuitionist ethics. In spite of a naïve positivist starting-point, Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus, Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a “new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. Then it reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, should be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. -/- 23. Edmund Husserl and the a-priori of action. The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl’s project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the a priori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy carried out in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach’s theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that basically sketches the very ideas ‘discovered’ later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section is dedicated to Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of ‘values’ – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler who claimed to Husserl’s legitimate heirs. -/- 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism. The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of ‘good’, its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with ‘emotive’ meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell’s ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of a rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson’s theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. Last of all, the discussion from the Forties about Hume’s law is described, mentioning Karl Popper’s argument and Richard Hare’s early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics. The chapter discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. A short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current is given trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot’s and Peter Geach’s critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre’s grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism. The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick’s and Moore’s fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine definitely refuted. A glimpse at this uproarious process is given through two examples. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of Utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This results in preference utilitarianism combined with a ‘Kantian’ version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare’s two-level preference utilitarianism where act utilitarianism plays the function of eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of action-guiding practical device. -/- 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy. The post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named ‘Rehabilitation of practical philosophy’ is described. Among the actors of such rehabilitation there were a few of Heidegger’s most brilliant disciples, and Hans-Georg Gadamer is chosen as a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle’s lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger’s lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the central role of the notion of phronesis. -/- 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics. Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This started, instead than the rehabilitation of prudence, with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. An examination of his argument is some detail is offered, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas’s elaboration on Apel’s theory. -/- 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics. Rawls’s distinction between a “political” and a “metaphysical” approach to one central part of ethical theory, namely the theory of justice, is interpreted as a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and neo-casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter, namely that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls’ view never will be close – on the basic criteria for judgment. -/- 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics. The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin’s new casuistry. -/- . (shrink)

John Venn w Formal Logic zbudował pewien system sylogistyki, będący jedną z realizacji idei kwantyfikacji orzeczników. Interesującą rekonstrukcję tego systemu zaproponował V.I. Markin. Markin posługuje się pięcioma funktorami pierwotnymi {aa,ai,ia,ii,e}. Wyrażenia elementarne SaaP,SaiP,SiaP,SiiP oraz SeP są czytane odpowiednio: wszelkie S są wszelkimi P, wszelkie S są pewnymi P, pewne S są wszelkimi P, pewne S są pewnymi P oraz żadne S nie są P.Markin podaje aksjomatykę dla tego systemu. Proponuje też reguły translacji jego formuł na język sylogistyki klasycznej, o aksjomatyce (...) Łukasiewicza {SaS, SiS, MaP/\SaM ε SaP, MaP/\MiS ε SiP} oraz reguły translacji odwrotnej.To sformułowanie sylogistyki Venna można uprościć przez przyjęcie konwencji notacyjnej:SφΨP / SφP/\PΨS SφP/\PΨS / SφΨP dla φ,Ψε{a,ι}.Proponowana jest nowa aksjomatyka dla sylogistyki Venna z mocnym rozumieniem zdań szczegółowo-twierdzących. Badane są związki logiczne między sylogistyką Venna i systemem Łulasiewicza. Zostaje sformułowany system z mocnym rozumieniem zdań szczegółowo-twierdzących. Podany jest dowód, że systemy SI i SL są równowane. (shrink)

John Venn w Formal Logic zbudował pewien system sylogistyki, będący jedną z realizacji idei kwantyfikacji orzeczników. Interesującą rekonstrukcję tego systemu zaproponował V.I. Markin. Markin posługuje się pięcioma funktorami pierwotnymi {aa,ai,ia,ii,e}. Wyrażenia elementarne SaaP,SaiP,SiaP,SiiP oraz SeP są czytane odpowiednio: wszelkie S są wszelkimi P, wszelkie S są pewnymi P, pewne S są wszelkimi P, pewne S są pewnymi P oraz żadne S nie są P.Markin podaje aksjomatykę dla tego systemu. Proponuje też reguły translacji jego formuł na język sylogistyki klasycznej, o aksjomatyce (...) Łukasiewicza {SaS, SiS, MaP/\SaM ε SaP, MaP/\MiS ε SiP} oraz reguły translacji odwrotnej.To sformułowanie sylogistyki Venna można uprościć przez przyjęcie konwencji notacyjnej:SφΨP / SφP/\PΨS SφP/\PΨS / SφΨP dla φ,Ψε{a,ι}.Proponowana jest nowa aksjomatyka dla sylogistyki Venna z mocnym rozumieniem zdań szczegółowo-twierdzących. Badane są związki logiczne między sylogistyką Venna i systemem Łulasiewicza. Zostaje sformułowany system z mocnym rozumieniem zdań szczegółowo-twierdzących. Podany jest dowód, że systemy SI i SL są równowane. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1, April 2000, pp. 179-181 A Puzzling Passage in "Why Utility Pleases" PHILLIP D. CUMMINS It could hardly be controversial that in "Why utility pleases," Section V of his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume purports to tell his readers why utility pleases. It is not controversial that in that section he rejected the deduction of morals from self-love, that is, the thesis (...) that utility pleases because actions and policies possessing it inevitably are in the actual or perceived selfinterest of the person who approves of them. This is not to deny there are interpretive issues. Nor is it to deny that there are passages which puzzle. Here is one: This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private interest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue. But though the solid, practical sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render his authority on the present subject very considerable, yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory. The quotation is from the new Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the Enquiry edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, who is also responsible for the critical Phillip D. Cummins is at the Department of Philosophy, 269 English Philosophy Building, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 180 Phillip D. Cummins edition. It should be noted that the quoted version agrees with both Nidditch's revised Selby-Bigge edition and the older but still useful Hendel edition. In short, this seems to be the standard wording. Nonetheless, the passage seems both to need correction and to be easily corrected. Hume presents Polybius as a highly respected defender of the selflove theory,1 one whose "authority on the present subject" is considerable. This asserted, he adds, "yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory." If we contrast the actual wording of the first conjunct to "yet is this an affair to be decided by authority," which expresses a genuine question, it is obvious that the first conjunct is a rhetorical question which implies that authority should decide the issue. The prior reference to Polybius seems to imply that he is the authority in question. Since, according to Hume, Polybius endorsed the selfish theory, the first conjunct itself seems to endorse the selfish theory. However, the second conjunct explicitly and directly challenges that very theory by asserting that both nature and experience oppose it. Thus, in the same sentential unit an appeal to authority is first endorsed, though it is in opposition to Hume's subsequent position, then rejected, as one would expect it to be, given that position. At worst there is inconsistency; at best a muddle. The simple correction is to rearrange three words in the first conjunct, replacing "is not this" with "this is not." These two phrases are generally used in opposition to one another; consider, for example, "Is not this the time to celebrate?" and "This is not the time to celebrate." The former grammatically is a question but its rhetorical function is to imply that it is indeed the time to celebrate, which the latter flatly denies. Note that in the present case, "yet this is not an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory" expresses a claim perfectly in keeping with the argument that follows. Hume will appeal to nature and experience to oppose even those important authorities who endorse the selfish theory. It might be objected that my proposed correction is not needed because sense can be made of the key sentential unit, "yet... theory," as it stands. It might be argued that in the first... (shrink)

re s u m o O pre s e nte artigo se inic ia com uma cláusula interna à filosof ia de l e u z e a na, a de que todo pens a me nto pode ser carc t e r i z a do pelo grau de ima n ê nc ia que o me s mo realiza. O pens a me nto de Hu me, como “e m p i r i s mo superior”, segundo ex (...) p ressão de Deleuze, pro mo v e r ia a ima n ê nc ia, ou seja, ele não se re nde r ia a ne n hum tra ns c e nde nt e. Ao me s mo tempo, como s u p e r i o r, se trata de um empirismo que não se pre nde ao ime d ia - t a me nte da do, como suporia um “e m p i r i s mo ing ê nuo”. Por isso, o empirismo seria um p e ns a me nto da ima n ê nc ia que apre s e nta certa alçada tra ns c e ndental, permitindo a Deleuze falar em “e m p i r i s mo tra ns c e nde nt a l ”. A complexa fórmula filosófica re s u m ida nessa ex p ressão de l e u z e a na será por nós, aqui, tratada sob o ponto de vista Hume, de mo do que o ceticismo humeano será tomado como um operador de imanência que of e - rece ao empirismo sua dimensão transcendental. Tal tra t a mento será levado a cabo em duas etapas, quais sejam: a) ceticismo e pro b l e ma da disjunção inclusiva na int e ra ç ã o das fa c u l da des ; b) ceticismo e tra ns c e ndent a l ida de dos juízos empíric o s. palavras-chave Ceticismo; Empirismo; Hume; Deleuze; Transcendental; Imanência. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN ITALIAN VIEW OF THE DEBATE ON VIRTUE TERENCE KENNEDY, C.Ss.R. Accademia Alfonsiana Rome, Italy FATHER GIUSEPPE ABBA, S.B.D., professor of moral philosophy at the Pontifical Salesian University in Rome, has written two volumes of prime importance for the theory of the moral virtues. Although writing in Italian, he has entered into the thick of debate in other languages, especially English. The first, Lex et Virtus: Studi sull'evoluzione delta (...) dottrina morale di san Tommaso d'Aquino (Las-Roma, 1983, 293 pp.) is every bit as wide ranging as its title suggests. His thesis is that St. Thomas's moral thought underwent a long and radical evolution that issued in "a new science" in the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiae totally centered in the virtues. His book is neatly divided in two parts: humanity under the regime of law and humanity under the regime of virtue. He argues that the Scriptum super Sententiis presents virtue as the capacity to put law into practice in life. Here law has priority because it is conceived as participation in the divine rectitude, and virtue is derivative in as far as it facilitates compliance with God's law, making our response easy, pleasurable and spontaneous by restraining the disorderly influence of passion on our moral response. The De V eritate, he maintains, follows the same descending schema. Truth is communicated downwards through the hierarchy of intellectual beings so that the human virtues are seen mainly in terms of how they reflect the divine truth, especially in the moral knowledge involved in free choice or liberum arbitrium. The Summa Contra Gentiles III classifies morality under the rubric of the law as rational submission to divine government through 123 124 TERENCE KENNEDY, c.ss.R. Providence. In this vision, our return to God as final end is given focal emphasis before being considered the fruit of our effort. Abba makes a strong case that in the Secunda Pars St. Thomas passes from a conception of morality based in law to one founded in the virtues. Morality assumes deeper significance in its own right because the human person is no longer viewed mainly as a direct reflection of divine truth but truly as imago Dei having dominion over his acts in freedom and deliberation. God, the subjectum of theology, is known through his effects in creation and the motus hominis in Deum provides matter for the speculative discipline of theology as the study of God. Morality unveils the mystery of God through how He works in our free activity drawing us to Himself. St. Thomas thus has very little in common with those contemporary moralists who are wholly taken up with the rightness of actions in normative ethics. Abba maintains that in the Summa St. Thomas was the first to afford morality its rightful place as an integral part in his theological synthesis. This involved a reworking of the idea of virtue beginning, with a fresh approach to habitus in the Ia!Jae. The determination of a habit ad unum is necessary because of the way a specifically human form is received in particular matter. This determination means not just a further specification of the matter, but the coming into being of new abilities, a creative enablement. of our nature with original energies so that it can reach its enc(' efficaciously. Virtue now has priority over law, because facility, pleasure and spontaneity are only the effects of this new interior transformation of our nature. Thus the originality of virtue arises not from our mode of acting firmiter, faciliter, delectabiliter, but from the new interior capacities by which we can realize our moral selves, naturally and supernaturally. Law is thereafter thought of in relation to its service of virtue as an external command promulgated for the government of a collectivity. It is given precisely so as to educate the collectivity to virtue. In the community governed by God's divine law it is not possible to follow His law without being enlivened by the infused virtues. The eternal law is not exhausted by our understanding of the precepts of divine law THE DEBATE ON VIRTUE 125 but it embraces God's complete idea... (shrink)

V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:iA NOTE ON W. J. HILL'S "THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AFTER VATICAN II" F. F. CENTORE St. Jerome's Oollege, University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario GOD MAY NOT :be dead, hut certamly 1any strictly philosophical, scientific, rational approach to God 'WIOuld seem to ibe derud today. Modern thought, even rumong deeply religious people, seems to J:nwe despaired of ever being ruble to pwve rbhe existence oi God to anyone, even (...) to someone who not 'SO willfully prejudiced against relig~on. that he simply rrefuses to view the evidence in 1an open-minded, calm, am.d rreflective iway. However, this does :not mean that our,apip:voach to God must be strictly emotional and ir.rational. It may >still 1be reasonable rto believe in God, even though we cannot rprove his existence in 'Some strictly r:ationrul way. Rather,than beginning with our ordinary human experience of the real exbramenrtail world and,working our way up to a knowledge o:f the bet that God exists·, we might take a more inner.,directed, psychofogicail, humanistic, phenomenological, historical app1 voach to such knowledge. Such an aiprproach might even 1be more effective and more convincing rto un1believers. Reoent writers on the modern God-question ha1v;e emphasi~ed the notion that rational wgruments :for the existence (and natuire ) of God may :be :a:ll 1weH and :good hut only for ia oomputer or a rolbot. What modern man needs is not 1 so much 1a krrmwledge of God as ;a persona1 relrutionshlp to God. And perhaps the hesit 1w:ay to achieve this is not to throw out completely the role of reason in providing a.scientific support for God'1 s existence ibut to rev;errse the pmcess. We must first come to a personrul ruwaireneiss of God 1 and then proceed to v;alida;te rthfus 531 53~ F. F. CENTORE awareuess via scientific confirmation. After all, how can anyone ever hope even to 1begin the search for God unless he already hais some ·awareness of God's e:ristence? According to John Hick, fo.r inst:mce, this is especially true in the Juda.eo-Christian tradition and, hy extension, in those other religious traiditions 1 which derive f["om it, such as Islam. H " to kno·w " means " to be a1ble to prove hy syllogistic reasoning," then the Jews of the Old 'I1esbament did not know God. Instead of attempting to prove the existence of God they took his existence £or granted. " They thought of God as an experienced reality rather than as an inferred entity." i The ancient £aithful were as sure of the existence of their God as they we:ve of the material wo:rld which surrounded them. There was. no need to :become rationalistic rubout it. In iaddition, even if they had turned ra:tiona1listic it would hav;e been of no use whatsoever to them. F11om the point of view of faith, all of the theistic proofs (none of which is v;ery oompelling or cogent an;}'iway) are completely ir:velevant. They can actually do nothing to move anyone to :feel and act in a religious way. AH such proofs are only for pedants who are content to 1live an empty,and ·sterile rubstract life within their own minds rather than wailking in the living p:vesence of the divine. Although there may well. he a place for the rational development of our intuitive sense of the living presence of God as expressed in revelation, once we are in full possession of such a revelation, it must always hold a place secondary to the experienced fact of £aith. Thus, even though modern religious thinkers reject natuira:l theology, "This modern theofogioal rejection of natural theology is not necessarily motiva:ted ·by an ir:vationaJi.st distrust of reason." 2 There is a :vole :for reason, hut only so long as it comes: after we already know thrut God exists. Since reason ialone can never pirove the existence 0£ God, ·reve1 J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1983), pp. 59-60. 2 Ibid., p. 74. A NOTE ON W. J. HILL 533 lation 1 and ·faith... (shrink)

Let κ and λ be infinite cardinals, F a filter on κ, and G a set of functions from κ to κ. The filter F is generated by G if F consists of those subsets of κ which contain the range of some element of G. The set G is $ -closed if it is closed in the $ -topology on κ κ. (In general, the $ -topology on IA has basic open sets all Π i∈ I U i such (...) that, for all $i \in I, U_i \subseteq A$ and $|\{i \in I: U_i \neq A\}| .) The primary question considered in this paper asks "Is there a uniform ultrafilter on κ which is generated by a closed set of functions?" (Closed means $ -closed.) We also establish the independence of two related questions. One is due to Carlson: "Does there exist a regular cardinal κ and a subtree T of $^{ such that the set of branches of T generates a uniform ultrafilter on κ?"; and the other is due to Pouzet: "For all regular cardinals κ, is it true that no uniform ultrafilter on κ is analytic?" We show that if κ is a singular, strong limit cardinal, then there is a uniform ultrafilter on κ which is generated by a closed set of increasing functions. Also, from the consistency of an almost huge cardinal, we get the consistency of CH + "There is a uniform ultrafilter on ℵ 1 which is generated by a closed set of increasing functions". In contrast with the above results, we show that if κ is any cardinal, λ is a regular cardinal less than or equal to κ and P is the forcing notion for adding at least $(\kappa^{ generic subsets of λ, then in V P , no uniform ultrafilter on κ is generated by a closed set of functions. (shrink)

We present a novel variant of decision making based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to describe a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision making of real human beings. The theory characterizes entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle, known (...) as the disjunction effect, can be explained quantitatively as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The disjunction effects, observed in experiments, are accurately predicted using a theorem on interference alternation that we derive, which connects aversion-to-uncertainty to the appearance of negative interference terms suppressing the probability of actions. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. A series of experiments are analyzed and shown to be in excellent agreement with a priori evaluation of interference effects. The conjunction fallacy is also shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect, and novel experiments testing the combined interplay between the two effects are suggested. (shrink)

The second of these lines seems to be the result of an interpolation designed to spell out the implicit sense of the first. In 241–6 Ion has expressed amazement that Creusa should be weeping at the sight of Apollo's sanctuary, a sight which brings other visitors joy. She prefaces her explanation of this with an assurance which in its transmitted form is elegantly translated by Grégoire: ‘Il n'est point discourtois de ta part, étranger, de marquer ta surprise au sujet de (...) mes pleurs.’ But there are reasons for doubting I the authenticity of line 248: Line 247 is self-sufficient, as is shown by IA 1402: τ μν σόν, νενι, γενναίως χει. This also gives the closest parallel for the use of τ σόν in reference to the attitude which a previous speaker's words have just expressed. Other instances of τ σόν, tout court, are helpfully grouped in Allen and Italie's Concordance to Euripides, s.v. σός. τ σόν…[adverbial phrase] χει occurs also in Hek. 1195 and Med. 312; cf. HF 165, Hel. 893, Pho. 995 with τομόν. These make it unlikely that τ χόν in our passage is to be taken adverbially, as perhaps Grégoire intended with ‘de ta part’, rather than as subject of χει. Tro. 82 might be adduced for the alternative , but there is no reason for Creusa to be saying emphatically ‘as far as you are concerned’. (shrink)

A relative tensor calculus is formulated for expressing equations of mathematical physics. A tensor time derivative operator ▽ b a is defined which operates on tensors λia...ib. Equations are written in a rigid, flat, inertial or other coordinate system a, altered to relative tensor notation, and are thereby expressed in general flowing coordinate systems or materials b, c, d, .... Mirror tensor expressions for ▽ b a λic...id and ▽ b a λic...id exist in a relative geometry G if and (...) only if a rigid coordinate system a exists in G, where ▽ b a λic = λ ,0c ic + λkev ckc aic + λ kc ic v b ckc , ▽jcλic = λ ,jc ic + λkcΓ jc kc ie , and v b aic is the velocity of b relative to a with components in c. These operators are convenient in theoretical analyses and can be incorporated into machine programs for the numerical solution of physical problems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CREATOR AND CAUSALITY: A CRITIQUE OF PRE-CRITICAL OBJECTIONS ANDREW BEARDS University of Oalgary Calgary, Alberta IN SOME QUARTERS arguments ias to the existence or non-existence of God are still regarded as intellectually respectaible. Indeed, interest in such arguments is not restricted to those with a strictly philosophical or theological training. Every so often one may observe some specialist from the physical sciences taking an interest in the philosophical discussion (...) of cosmological issues. Such has been the case with the recent contributions of the physicist Paul Davies.1 However, such contributions are likely to invite from the philosopher the response that the generalized notions which the scientist attempts to transpose from the particular field of his scientific interest are the very notions which feature in the current debates on the philosophy and methodology of the sciences. Such debates bring into question the status of these scientific notions and therefore render any putative generalized or even metaphysical application of them problematic. Discussions of natural theology, then, often appear to be conducted in a manner which tends to take too much for granted with regard to the terms employed. The notion of causality, central to such,argumentation, is a case in point. Often enough a simple ":billiard hall" image of causal interaction seems to he all that one is required to keep before the mind in order to follow the lines of argument involved, he they ~or or aiga.inst the postulation of a First Cause. Thus, in the often referred to r:adio.debate on the existence of God between 1 Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: T'ouchstone Books, 1984). 573 574 ANDREW BEARDS Bertrand Russell and Fl1ederick Copleston, Russell simply averred that he did not feel compelled to accept that a causal chain extended heyond the ·World to some First Cause. For, indeed, if one imagines a line of billiard halls transmitting momentum one to the other, there is nothing unintelligible about picturing a first!billiard hall initiating the process apparently unaided. Hume has surely taught us that much. If one is to heed the present debates raging in that arena known as the philosophy of science (by which term one can understand epistemology, metaphysics and virtually ·any other topic tr:aditiona1ly designated philosophical), then one can.be forgi¥en for asking how the question as to the existence of God could he raised in an intelligiible manner. For if one is to agree with Richa1d J. Bernstein's assertion that contemporary philosophy manifests, in the ma.in, 1a rebellious attitude to the "father figure,, of the methodical Descartes,2 then one can be equally well impressed by the fact that this " rebellious spirit" is no Jess informed iby a respect for the Kantian attempt to descry the parameters of valid human knowing. And was it not the Kantian achievement to have dispelled the oibfuscation of metaphysics, thereby eliminating the grounds which were helieved to have substantiated a rational affirmation of the existence of God? The term 'Pre-Critical ' in the title of this essay is, therefore, intended as an e¥ocation of the Kantian demand for a critical v;alidation of the terms employed in philosophical argumentation. However, I shall attempt to advance the thesis that the Kantian enterprise does not, in fact, result in a happy resolution of the problems which it sets for itself. This is, of course, a thesis which could 'be proposed f.rom a number of divergent philosophical standpoints. It is my intention to argue here, however, that the work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan provides,a more satisfactory method for the carrying through of the critical endeavour to validate epistemologi2 Richard J, Bernstein, Beyond Objectwism and.Relatwism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 18. CREATOR AND CAUSALITY 575 cally the philosophical,statements we propose. I believe it is the merit of Lonergan's work to have developed positions on the hasis of an explication of the exigences operative in criticism itself, such that any criticism of this explication will he rbut an example of an incoherent criticism,attempting to invalidate its own procedures.3 In what follows I shall attempt to develop the above-mentioned argument to the effect... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MEISTER ECKHART AND THE NEOPLATONIC HERITAGE: THE THINKER'S WAY TO GOD RICHARD Wooos, O.P. Loyola University of Ohioago Ohicago, Illinois IN BOTH HIS LIFE rand preaching, Meister Eokrhart's " way" was pre-eminently.a spirituality of the mind. The srpeoulat:ive inqui.rires.and p:roibings thaJt animate his iSChD'l-·arly woliks 1also f!:>iervrude his sermons ·and treatisies, while a pastoral, homiletic inrberrtion iieciproca:1ly permeates the scholarly.worrks, particularly in regard to.the Meister'1s fascination with rthe Woil1d. (...) Heinrich Deni:fle, 1who disonviered and first commented upon Eckhart's Laitin writings in the 1880s, concluded that the Meister faclmd the clarity of conception and precision of expression characteristic of the great scholastic figmes who preoeded him, partiou1ady Albert the Grea:t 1and 'lihomas Aquinrus.1 B:ut more reoent Eckhart scholars have increasingly •argued that Denifle's oonoern to :ve£ute uncritically inflated characteriz,ations of Eckhart's philosophloa:l genius, notrubly that of Wilhelm Preger,.led him to undel'V'alue and indeed misrepvesen:t •the Meister's ireal goal a;nd bme achievement. Indeed, tto the modern critical eye, aided :by a oontury 1 "Eckhart ein unklarer Denker war, der sich der Consequenzen seiner Lehrer resp. seiner ausdruckweise nicht bewusst war. Gerade bei den schwierigen Lehrpunkten, wo Klarheit und Scharfe der Begriffe und des Ausdrucks mehr als je geboten ist, tritt dies zu Tage. Gerade in den entscheidenden Momenten verlasst ihn die Klarheit.... Eckhart besass aber nicht die geistige Begabung iiber die Scholastik hinauszugeben und doch innerhalb der Granzen der Wahrheit zu bleiben." "Meister Eckharts lateinische Schriften, und die Grundanschauung seiner Lehre," in A.rahiv fii,r Literatur unCl Kirchengeschichte Cles Mittelalters, ed. H. Denifie and Franz Ehrle (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 482, 521. 609 610 RICHARD WOODS, O.P. of ]urbher di:s:cioverieis 1rund study, " the scholastic Eckhart is an original.and spooulaxbivie til:rintker, 1and not only a spirit's itineriary fa~om.aJJJd ha:ck to its eternail. Sourioe-4hie Ohristian NoopLatonic schema th.at Eckhart im.heri'bed room St. Albert tb!e Greait rund, 1behind him, Hugh and Richa;rid of St. Victo:r, Thomas Ga1lus, John Sarraoenus, John Soottus Eriugena, Diornysiius the Areop1aigibe, P!l.'odus, and, penultimrutely, Pilotinus!himself. For thls gre:art theoa Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke: Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, 11 Vols. to date (Stuttgart and Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1958-). German sermons will be identified hereafter by their number in the Deutsche Werke and, for English translation, by the corresponding page number in the Walshe edition. 9 " Eine Koiner Handscrift mit lateinischen Eckhart-Exzerpten," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 31 (1961) : 204-12. In volume three of his edition, Walshe includes a translation of a fragment of one of Eckhart's sermons discovered by Prof. Kurt Ruh in 1967 and published in the Zeitschrift fii,r deutohes Aitertum 111 (1982) : 219-25. See ed. cit., pp. 131-35. ECKHART AND NEOPLATONISM 618 ~ogical tradition, liecently examined in some detail iby John Macquarrie alllld Andrew Louth, stretches hack evoo £artlier to tbie Oappadocian Fraithe'I"s, Origien, Philo, :and at the source, Pilato.in Smee the 1app1e1amance of Eoklhamt'1s more aoadiemic Laltin wiorrks, op;inion has heen divided as 1 00 their importance :velative ibo the more familiar German sermons iand tT1eatises for understarndmg the Meister~s authentic tooching. Some recent commenibato 'l.1s 1 sti1l 1:Jend to favor the lattier aJ.moot enti'11ely, even wihile acknOW11edging t:hie impo'11tooce of the forn11er; some favor the Latin.11 Critical opinion :seems 'bo have turned in the direction of remphrusizing the importalllice of both.the Latin and the German :works in 01der 1bo unders:tand the whole Eckhartthe teacher and the p:veacheT.12 But to understand to what extent Ed.mart ias,a tlheologian, philosopher, arrd mystic was indebted to Obrisltian Nooplatmrism it is raliso n:ecess1acy to see him in the oonteJct of his,w;orks, his method, and his scholarly and apostolic career. The Scholar and His Temper While Echltart had ra ik!een phi1osorphica1 temperament, he did not 1rus,a rule compose racrudemic 1weatises. Ratiher, he scatltJeTed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL TO FREGE, 24 MAY 1903: "I BELIEVE I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT CLASSES ARE ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS" GREGORY LANDINI Philosophy / University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242, USA It was his consideration of Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal, Russell recalls in My Philosophical Development, that led in the spring of 1901 to the discovery of the paradox of the class of all classes not members of (...) themselves. "Never glad confident morning again", were Whitehead's reported words (MPD, p. 58). Whitehead was, of course, wrong. Russell had many new confident mornings. One in particular apparently occurred on 19 May 1903. On 23 May Russell wrote in his journal: "Four days ago 1 solved the Contradiction -the relief of this is unspeakable" (Papm 12: 24). The "solution" was communicated to Whitehead, who responded by telegram: "Heartiest congratulations Aristoteles secundus. 1 am delighted" (Clark, p. III). But it was not long before Russell knew his proposal was inadequate. On the form he would scrawl: "A propos of solVing the Contradiction. [But the solution was wrong]" (ibid; Russell's brackets). The episode is intriguing. What was the proposal? Russell's correspondence with Frege sheds some light. On 20 October 1902 Frege had sent a letter suggesting a way to avoid the contradiction. Frege's suggestion, formulated in a great hurry so that it might appear in the Appendix of Vol. II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, was to abandon his Basic Law V; zcj>z =zez. ==. (x)(x. ==. ex), and to replace it by Russell to Frege, 24 May I903 161 V' zz =zez. ==. (x)(x *zz & x* zez: ~ : x. ==. ex). The underlying idea was to accept that one concept may have the same extension as another even though the two concepts are not coextensive. Though he thought the underlying idea "probably correct",! Russell expressed reservation in a reply of 12 December:... I find it difficult to accept your solution even though it is probably correct. Do you deny, e.g., that all classes form a class? And if this is admitted, then it is possible that - ana. Moreover, the class of non-humans is a. non-human. Otherwise it must be admitted that not ail objects fall either under a or not-a; namely, if a is a range of values, then a fails neither under a nor under not-a. This contradicts the law of excluded middle, which will be inconvenient to say the least.2 (Frege I980, p. 151) Frege's response of 28 December does not mention the contradiction, and Volume II of his Grundgesetze appeared early in 1903. Russell's reservations concerning Frege's solution· continue in a letter to Frege of 20 February 1903: What you say about my contradiction is of the greatest interest to me. Do you believe that the range of values remains unchanged if some subclass of the class is assigned to it as a new member? Extension seems to fit this view better than intension. Bur I fe;el far from clear about this question. (Frege I980, p. 155) Frege replied on 21 May, explaining that in general a class does not remain unchanged when a particular subclass is added to it, but that two concepts may have the same extension (the same class) when the only difference between them is that this class falls under the first concept but not under the second (p. 157). Then on 24 May 1903 Russell excitedly wrote Frege of a solution of the paradox of classes: "I received your letter this morning, and 1 am replying to it at once, for russell: the Journal of the Berrrand Russdl Archives McMasrer University Library Press n.S.•2 (wincer 1992-93): 160-85 ISSN 0036-01631 • The same evaluation appears in Russell's Appendix to The Principles ofMathematics (p. 522). 2 Frege's '\- a II b" is Peano and Russell's "a E b". Russell should have put "~ana". 162 GREGORY LANDINI I believe I have discovered that classes are entirely superfluous. Your designation i(z) can be used for itself, and x E i(z) for (x).... this seems to me to avoid the contradiction" (p. 159). The proposal is also mentioned in a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WAiINWRIGHT, MARI'.rAIN, AND AQUINAS ON TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES1 Lours RoY, O.:P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts WHAT COULD ALLOW thoo1ogiianis to s1ay that rbrtanJScendent expmiences we, exiplicitly or implicitly, expenienoos of God? To ooswieir tMs question fully, one would ihavie Ibo ooga;ge in :two d:iisltmot mqumi1es. Fiirsit, religious, moml, iand psyoho101 giical icristeci:a 1are required in the evtalurution of concrete oases. They ctan he found in rthe grerut spi:ritUJal wriitings (...) of humankind. Secood, one mustt have reOOUTISe to ep;iisttemo1ogiica:l :and thieo1ogiaa1 foru.ndmbions if one wianits 1to 1an.swer tb.ie questtion in. its generality. ln,thJi:s a:riticle, I shall not preserut 1tihe religious, moral, 1and psychofogica1 criteria, because I sihou1d Jrike to OOiilCelllb:iaJte on mrueillecrtUJal prohliems invohiimg tihe sooond kmd of ·consideration. I shiaill use ais 1a ISl'bar:bing-pomt 1a book on mys:ticism written by Wiilliiam J. W1ainwcight. Turr tihe purposes of ttihis ess:ay, "trlanJScenidelllt experiences" wiilil. mean whmt W1affin:WI"ight calls " mystical experienoos " or " uniJtM"Y srbrubeis." 2 The phvase wi:ll. ailso inclUJde Otito'1s " nu:minoUJs etpeirieinces," Mrusforw's " peak expeme:nces" and, vecy hrorudJy, wll experiences that do not :focus on 1a, specific tidea :but afiectively open up to the mySltery wll:uich enoompas1ses hruman li£e. 1 I am grateful to the members of the Boston Theological Society for their questions and comments on the initial version of this essay. 2See his definition, in Mysticism: A. Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), IS. The rest of his first chapter offers a good discussion of problems of typology as well as of the distinction between descriptions and interpretations of mystical experiences. Unfortunately I cannot take account of this interesting discussion in the limits of this paper. 655 656 LOUIS ROY, O.P. In conrtending thrut my:stical experieTIJces ihav;e nnetic v:al,idity if they are ra speciiaI kind of perception, W ainw~igrhit tries to 'Settle an 1:epis1temo10-gicra1l is1sue; ill downplaying "doctrina1l con-.sideration:s" and iJn rejeobing ",a thieo1ogical op~nion whioh cannoit he esbaiblished ihy philosoplhi1oal rea1s10n," 3 he suggesit,s 1bhat his oolJJ!teTIJtiion can 1and should he 1supp01rted only by philosophioal a11gumelJJ!t1s. In thi'S esisay, I intend 1to ques1truon thi:s two.fo1d 1tlhesis of Wwinwrrtiight'1s 1and to explore an albernartive. Wa:inwright, whose manner of dea1ing wirbh iinitellectuaJ proh1ems 1acoo,rds with \the p11esent-day main lme in Ang1o-American philosophy of re1i§ion,4 non:ebheless pays metiiculou:s a.trbention Ito neoscho1a1s1tic theori!es of mys1tiioism in Chapter 4 of his hook. Such 1an a;t1t:empt 1at serious diJalogue is of specia,l :intel'es1t since :i:t illu:stria1tes the diffioulty of finding a mee1ting ground for three qUJite different scho1w1·Jy wo,rlds: the p0:s1t-rpie1t~st one, wihich I regard a,s W,ruinwr.ighit'·s, modern sohoilais1t1icrsm, and Thomas Aquinas. A1though W1a1inwr1igh1t does not refer 1 to the lat:ter's views on the.topic, these views nev:erthe1e:s,s de:serve examination bo1th 1a1s the sou11oe of neoscho:iJa,stic 1theorie1s and 1as conti :ia:sting in 1s1 evera1 111espects wiith,them. The first pa~t of my paper will sketch three of the intellec1tuaJ contexits in which triam:soendefll!t experi!enoes may be discussed. The second part will highlight some features of Aquinrus's episitmnology and theo1ogy of gmce which whll enable us fo dertel'ITl!iDJe 1 at whait levels of cogn:iition experienceis of 1t11amiscendence should be s]tua1ted 1 and in what 1s1ense they may rbe s1aid to he experielll!ceis of God. 'Iihe third rpart wm presie111t how Thomais envisages the role of love :in 1the affective knowledge tha1t rbe1ieviers i;eceiive of God. F1inailly, the fomlth pamt will indicrabe the modial~ty of such lmowledge, namely, the dimect a1iva:renerss of orur aets and fee1ings of 1ove. a Wainwright, 162-163 and 180. 4 Exemplified by such authors as John Hick, Stephen Katz, Ninian Smart, Walter T. Stace, R. C. Zaehner. TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES 657 I. Three lnterprretative Contexts Since Schleiermadher, moist German... (shrink)

re s u m o O pre s e nte artigo se inic ia com uma cláusula interna à filosof ia de l e u z e a na, a de que todo pens a me nto pode ser carc t e r i z a do pelo grau de ima n ê nc ia que o me s mo realiza. O pens a me nto de Hu me, como “e m p i r i s mo superior”, segundo ex (...) p ressão de Deleuze, pro mo v e r ia a ima n ê nc ia, ou seja, ele não se re nde r ia a ne n hum tra ns c e nde nt e. Ao me s mo tempo, como s u p e r i o r, se trata de um empirismo que não se pre nde ao ime d ia - t a me nte da do, como suporia um “e m p i r i s mo ing ê nuo”. Por isso, o empirismo seria um p e ns a me nto da ima n ê nc ia que apre s e nta certa alçada tra ns c e ndental, permitindo a Deleuze falar em “e m p i r i s mo tra ns c e nde nt a l ”. A complexa fórmula filosófica re s u m ida nessa ex p ressão de l e u z e a na será por nós, aqui, tratada sob o ponto de vista Hume, de mo do que o ceticismo humeano será tomado como um operador de imanência que of e - rece ao empirismo sua dimensão transcendental. Tal tra t a mento será levado a cabo em duas etapas, quais sejam: a) ceticismo e pro b l e ma da disjunção inclusiva na int e ra ç ã o das fa c u l da des ; b) ceticismo e tra ns c e ndent a l ida de dos juízos empíric o s. palavras-chave Ceticismo; Empirismo; Hume; Deleuze; Transcendental; Imanência. (shrink)

In 2008, the late Allan B. Wolter, OFM worked with Oleg V. Bychkov, Ph.D. to publish a ‘safe’ version of the Reportatio IA of Franciscan Master John Duns Scotus. The publication of this first book of Scotus’s Commentary on the Sentences from his Paris teaching offered scholars an opportunity to follow the Subtle Doctor’s reasoning throughout his entire teaching career: from the earliest Lectura texts, through the Ordinatio teaching, to what many consider his final say on certain matters when he (...) taught in Paris, between 1302 and 1304.While the Ordinatio claims to have been re-worked by Scotus himself, and Reportatio IA to have been ‘examined’ by Scotus, similar claims to definitive status do not appear... (shrink)

resumo Esse artigo investiga a leitura que Shaftesbury fez de Marco Aurélio, a fim de comparar a visão estóica da individual ida de e da ide nt ida de pessoal com o conceito lockia no de “self” e, de ma ne i ra mais ge ral, com os mo dos pelos quais a filosofia mo de rna entendeu o si-me s mo. A ênfase recai sobre a conexão int r í nseca ent re sistema e s u b j e (...) t i v ida de no estoicismo imperial. Discute-se a re s i s t ê nc ia de autores cont e m p o r âneos em aceitar a descrição da alma ra c io nal dos estóicos como um “self”. Também se discute a aplicação que Mic hel Foucault fez do seu conceito de “subjetivação” à id é ia estóica de “si-me s mo ”. palavras-chave Estoicismo; self; identidade pessoal; Shaftesbury; Marco Aurélio; Foucault. (shrink)

The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring long?term storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply (...) to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights?going?out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. (shrink)

While specifications and verifications of concurrent systems employ Linear Temporal Logic , it is increasingly likely that logical consequence in image will be used in the description of computations and parallel reasoning. Our paper considers logical consequence in the standard image with temporal operations image and image . The prime result is an algorithm recognizing consecutions admissible in image, so we prove that image is decidable w.r.t. admissible inference rules. As a consequence we obtain algorithms verifying the validity of consecutions (...) in image and solving the satisfiability problem. We start by a simple reduction of logical consecutions of image to equivalent ones in the reduced normal form . Then we apply a semantic technique based on image-Kripke structures with formula definable subsets. This yields necessary and sufficient conditions for a consecution to be not admissible in image. These conditions lead to an algorithm which recognizes consecutions admissible in image by verifying the validity of consecutions in special finite Kripke structures of size square polynomial in reduced normal forms of the consecutions. As a consequence, this also solves the satisfiability problem for image. (shrink)

The study of the “first wave” of reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason in Germany from the second half of the 1780s until the beginning of the nineteenth century reveals the paradoxical status of the Kantian transcendental subject. While the existence of the transcendental subject, whatever the term means, is not open to question since it arises from the very essence of critical philosophy, the fundamental status of the subject is sometimes questioned in this period. Although the meaning of (...) the concept of transcendental subject seems obvious today it lends itself to various interpretations in the late eighteenth century. To achieve my goal I have undertaken a textological analysis of the works of the earliest opponents and followers of the Kantian critique and a reconstruction of the conceptual field in the midst of which the transcendental subject has been planted. Among others I draw on the works of J. S. Beck, J. A. Eberhard, J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, S. Maimon, K. L. Reinhold, G. E. Schulze and A. Weishaupt. The authors of the period are grouped depending on the common themes and questions that prompted them to turn to the concept of the transcendental subject, even though the results of their reflections did not always coincide. These authors think of the transcendental subject in its relationship to the transcendental object, or as “something = х”, and in terms of the relationship of representation to the object. It is characterised sometimes as something absolutely hollow, and sometimes as the fullness of true reality. The status ascribed to the transcendental subject is sometimes that of a thing-in-itself and sometimes that of a “mere” idea. Finally, Kant’s transcendental subject was sometimes seen as something to be overcome and sometimes as an infinite challenge to understanding. (shrink)

We prove that the diagonalizable algebras of PA and ZF are not isomorphic.